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Abstract
We analyze the entry and exit activity in the UK airline markets in
the post-liberalisation period and study the di¤erential traits between tra-
ditional and low cost carriers. Alongside with the characteristics tradition-
ally highlighted as determinants of entry (e.g., airport presence and network
economies), we nd that the existence of charter or seasonal operators, prod-
uct di¤erentiation opportunities and the level of quality provided by the in-
cumbents are also relevant in explaining entry and/or exit. Despite the liber-
alisation policies, the contestability of important large markets still seems to
be limited.
J.E.L. Classications: L11, L93
Keywords: Entry, Exit, Airlines, Conditional Logit.
1 Introduction
The airline industry has changed dramatically throughout the world in the last years.
Technological innovations, deregulation and changes in demand characteristics have
reshaped considerably the industry and as a consequence, the competitive practices
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by the participants in those markets (Borenstein, 1992).1 In Europe, the liberali-
sation process started in 1987 and has developed gradually, granting progressively
more rights to European carriers to operate within the European market, till 1997
when permission was granted to European carriers to operate domestic ights in
member countries other than their home market. In 2004, a last legislative package
was issued by the Commission with the aim to create a Single Paneuropean Sky by
integrating the air management structures of the member countries.2
With regards to the e¤ects of liberalisation various empirical studies have shown
positive e¤ects on fares and increases in consumer welfare (Morrison and Winston,
1990; Schipper et al., 2003). Whether a market liberalisation is socially benecial
hinges around the creation of the conditions for a sustainable contestable market
structure. These include low sunk costs, both exogenous and endogenous, and the
existence of potential competitors who can easily enter and exit (Bailey and Panzar,
1981; Motta, 2004). Generally, an airline is considered a potential entrant if it is
already serving one or both of the endpoints of a route (Berry, 1992; Morrison and
Winston, 1990). Such a presence, when the costs of entry and exit are low, is sup-
posed to be su¢ cient to limit the exercise of market power (Hurdle at al., 1989; Ito
and Lee, 2004; Goldsbee and Syverson, 2004). Other studies of the airlines market,
however, reveal how the competitive outcome is best approximated when potential
competition turns into actual competition (Borenstein, 1992). Interestingly, in a
combined study of entry and exit, Joskow et al. (1994) show that entry and exit
have opposite sign e¤ect on average price levels but not on output. A particular
type of actual and potential competitors that has become increasingly important
in recent years is that of the low cost carriers (henceforth, LCC), the most notable
examples being Southwest Airline in the U.S. and Ryan Air and Easyjet in Europe
(Boguslaski et al., 2004; Piga and Filippi, 2002). These have been posing a very
signicant competitive pressure on traditional carriers, both in the roles of potential
and actual competitors.3
To address the issue whether market forces are operating as freely as possible,
1For a discussion of the economic aspects of code-sharing alliances, see Brueckner (2001). Evi-
dence suggesting that non-linear pricing and price discrimination are common yield management
practices is given in Giaume and Guillou (2004), Pels and Rietveld (2004) and Stavins (2001).
2Regulations (EC) No 549/2004, 550/2004, 551/2004 and 552/2004.
3The success enjoyed by these companiesbusiness strategy has induced the imitation by airlines
located in other parts of the world. For instance, de Oliveira (2004) studies the entry patterns of
the Brazilian LCC Gol and its evolution over time.
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various studies investigated what drivers a¤ect an entry or exit decision. Airport
presence seems to be a key factor for the after-entry prots of operating in a given
citypair route (Berry, 1992). Moreover, an airlines entry and exit behavior is found
to be signicantly inuenced by its own (but not its competitors) network (Mor-
rison and Winston,1990). Both results support the notion that, in the U.S. post-
deregulation, hub-and-spoke networks were valued not only for the cost savings they
permitted, but also for the market power they o¤ered (Borenstein, 1989).4
Here, the analysis will focus on the entries and exits by airlines in European
routes departing from the ten main UK airports for the period January 1997 to
June 2004, that is, immediately after the industry was fully liberalised. Our study
is in the line of Berry (1992) and Boguslaski et al. (2004) but departs from previous
contributions in a number of aspects. First, we study the characteristics that make
an entry (or an exit) arise in one route but not in another substitute route, using a
conditional logit model.5 Second, this is, to the best of our knowledge, the rst study
of entries conducted with European data. More specically, the entries (exits) made
by the main airlines (main LCC and main traditional carriers) are considered. Third,
given the LCC increasing presence in the European markets, we investigate whether
their entry (exit) behavior di¤ers from that of the traditional carriers (TC).6 Finally,
we tackle some issues not previously studied, such as the impact of the presence of
seasonal and charter carriers and the level of quality provided by incumbents on the
likelihood of entry and exit.
Our descriptive analysis shows that the LCC, relative to the TC, were responsible
for a greater share of entries and a lower share of exits in the period under study.
Further, a considerable increase in the number of routes operated to/from regional
airports is also observed. Our econometric analysis indicates that entry and exit
are less likely in large markets, suggesting that they tend to occur in routes not
covered by traditional carriers. The presence of charter ights attracts entry, but
appears unrelated to exit. As far as concentration is concerned, the ndings suggest
4Although the hub-and-spoke model remains the predominant network structure in the airline
industry, Boguslaski et al. (2004) observe that in the 1990s Southwest, a LCC, has avoided building
a hub-centric network of its own, preferring to enter denser markets with higher per-capita incomes.
5Traditionally, the empirical studies of entry in airline markets have used cross-sectional probit
models in order to explain entry vs. no-entry in a given route. This implies assuming that the
decisions of entry across alternative routes are independent.
6Some studies such as Boguslaski et al. (2004), de Oliveira (2004) and Lederman and
Januszewski (2003) have aimed at explaining the entry strategies of LCC without comparing them
with those of traditional carriers.
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a greater probability to observe entry where at least another company is already
operating. Consistently with the descriptive analysis, the main UK LCC exhibit
a greater propensity to entry relative to the main traditional counterparts: this is
particularly evident for the countries with the largest share of passengerstra¢ c.
Overall, the estimation results indicate that many factors that have been overlooked
in the existing literature, are important indicators of the probability to observe an
entry or an exit from a route. Finally, we observe limited entry and exit activity in
important, large markets, which raises concerns about their contestability in spite
of the liberalising e¤orts to enhance competition.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the
data sources and dene entry and exit while Section 3 illustrates some of the dis-
tinguishing traits characterising the post-liberalisation evolution of the British Civil
Aviation market. In section 4 we present the hypotheses underlying the variables
used in the empirical models together with some descriptive statistics. In section 5
and 6 we illustrate our methodology and present the estimation results respectively.
Section 7 concludes by discussing some of the policy implications of our study.
2 Dening entry and exit
We dene an "entry" as the rst scheduled operation by an airline on a specic route.
Analogously, an "exit" is dened as the last scheduled operation by an airline on a
specic route. This solves the problem of wrongly identifying seasonal ights (i.e.
ights operated only in periods of high demand) as entries/exits. For denitional
purposes, henceforth a route corresponds to an airport pair (e.g., London Stansted
- Rome Ciampino), while a market to a citypair (e.g., London with its four main
airports and Rome with two).
We have used data produced by the UK Civil Aviation Authority (henceforth,
CAA) to identify entries and exits. The CAA publishes on-line two types of data
that were used in this study. The rst considers punctuality statistics for all the
ights (i.e., domestic, European and International) operated from the ten main UK
airports.7 Information is published each month which shows the average delays
7These are London Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Luton and City Airport, Birmingham,
Manchester, Glasgow Int., Edinburgh, Newcastle. The choice of these airports is mostly based
on historical reasons, as in the past they were classied as the largest in terms of passengers tra¢ c.
Although such a classication may not hold any more, the CAA continues to release information
on these airports.
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on scheduled and charter services at each of the airports both in total and at an
individual route/airline level. Also, other company-specic monthly data are made
available, such as the number of ights operated on a given route. This is su¢ cient to
determine airlinesentries and exits. Indeed, the date of entry or exit corresponds
to the rst or the last period in which the CAA reports data for an individual
route/airline combination.
Various cautions were taken in the coding of these entry and exit dates. For
instance, entry/exit may result from the merger of two airlines. Although it was
not possible to track the e¤ects of all the mergers that took place over the period
of interest, corrections for the two most important ones in the British market were
made, namely for the Ryan Air - Buzz merger in March 2003 and the Easyjet -
GoFly one in December 2002.8 Also, there were cases where some traditional carriers
created their low-cost subsidiary, e.g., BMI British Midland and BMIBaby. In these
cases, the CAA may have started by coding the route serviced by the subsidiary as
if run by the holding company but, at a later stage, it may have switched to using
the proper subsidiary name. To prevent the spurious creation of entries and exits,
the subsidiary names were all recoded to that of the holding company.
The second type of CAA data used in our study is a collection of monthly
passengers tra¢ c statistics from practically the universe of UK airports, broken
down, at the route level, into scheduled and charter ights. From these records
it is possible to build up pictures of the activity at each reporting airport. It is
noteworthy that the tra¢ c statistics are not company-specic, therefore it is not
possible to determine how a company expanded its operations by making use of
secondary airports. However, tra¢ c information from the entire network of British
airport enables the creation of market (i.e., citypairs) attributes that may inuence
a rms observed decision to start or exit a route departing from one of the ten main
airports located in the same citypair. Punctuality statistics, and therefore entry and
exit dates, are available from January 1995, while tra¢ c statistics are available only
from January 1997 until June 2004. Consequently, the latter time interval is the one
used in our estimation sample.9
8Because both Easyjet and Ryan Air continued to service the majority of routes of the merged
rms, it would be incorrect to code their operations as new entries into a route. Similarly, the route
terminations by GoFly and Buzz were not coded as exits. More generally, services terminated due
to a companys bankrupt were coded as exits.
9June 2004 was obviously excluded from the exit model estimation sample, as it was impossible
to distinguish actual from ctitious exits arising from computer coding.
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3 The Evolution of the British market
Liberalisation of air transport in the European Union was the subject of a number of
packages" of measures, the third of which was adopted in July 1992 and applied as
from January 1993. This package gradually introduced freedom to provide services
within the European Union and led in April 1997 to the freedom to provide cabotage,
i.e. the right for an airline of one Member State to operate a route within another
Member State.10 Thus, before discussing the features of the empirical model of entry
and exit, a descriptive analysis of the evolution of the British airline market with
regards to its domestic and European routes is developed, in an attempt to highlight
some of the e¤ects of the liberalisation policies. Such an analysis will also provide
some basis for the estimation strategy.
Table 1 provides yearly statistics on the number of entries, exits, ights, routes,
and the mean number of competitors in the operated routes, broken down at the
companys level. The gures reported pertain only to the airlines activity from
the ten airports for which punctuality statistics are available. The companies are
broken down in three groups. First, data is reported for the six main LCC: Ryan
Air, Easyjet, GoFly, KLM UK (Buzz), MyTravelLite and FlyBe. Second, the largest
traditional carriers are considered. These include former ag-carriers and other
important players in either the UK or in other countries. The combination of main
LCC and main traditional carriers will be referred to, in the remainder of the study,
as "Main Airlines". Third, a fringe of other airlines is included in the data whose
consideration may shed some light on the e¤ects of the liberalisation process on the
British market, in particular as far as its contestability is concerned.
First, note the increasing number of entries/exits taking place after the liber-
alisation process, which became e¤ective in 1997. Overall, one can see that in the
period 97-99, a mean of 76 entries occurred yearly in the period 1997-1999 (229 in
total), increasing to an average per year of 86 in the period 2000-01 (171 in total for
that period) and 117 in the period 2002-2004 (294 in total).11 With respect to LCC,
one can see that in the period 97-99, a mean of 20 entries occurred yearly in the
period 1997-1999 (59 in total), increasing to an average per year of 29 in the period
2000-01 (58 in total for that period) and 38 in the period 2002-2004 (96 in total). A
10See http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/air/index_en.htm for more on the legislative and
the institutional framework.
11The 2004 data throughout the paper are only for the rst six months of the year.
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similar picture can be drawn from the data on exits, routes and number of ights,
which also show an increasing trend. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the ratio of
LCCsentries over LCCs exits is higher than that of the total sample, showing that
LCCs have been partly replacing traditional carriers in the market. As a result,
the proportion of routes operated by LCCs rose from 18.90% in 1999 to 31.25% in
2003. Similarly, the proportion of LCCsights rose in the period 1999 to 2003 from
18.90% to 28.02%.
Table 2 reports yearly gures by country on the number of entries, exits, ights,
companies, routes and the ratio of number of scheduled and charter passengers.
Note that the latter two statistics are derived from the tra¢ c data source, and
therefore include information on routes originating from all the UK airports. For
the subset of the eight largest countries in terms of passengers tra¢ c - namely
Spain, France, Italy, Germany, Irish Republic, Netherlands, Switzerland and UK -
a subtotal is also provided. This subset is henceforth denoted as "Main Countries".
Not surprinsingly, the majority of entries and exits (80.70% and 80.53% respectively)
take place in routes with origin or destination in the main countries. Moreover,
the total number of airlines operated in each country has remained fairly stable
throughout the series (increasing only in Finland and Portugal), while the number
of routes has generally increased in all countries, with the notable exceptions of
the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Quite relatedly, the number of ights to
the Netherlands, Belgium, Finland and Norway have slightly decreased. The latter
two points suggest a di¤erential e¤ect of the liberalisation process based on route
distance. Borenstein (1992) points out an increase in concentration of shorter routes
after deregulation in the U.S., and argues that this is a reection of the growth of the
hub-and-spoke operations that disappears once direct ights only are considered. In
the present case, only direct routes are included in the sample, and therefore the
more intense activity in destinations to farther countries is likely to be due to the
presence of economies of scale arising from the xed costs in the take-o¤and landing
phases. Another relevant aspect, which will the subject to further econometric
analysis, regards how the proportion of charter ight passengers over scheduled
ight passengers has been consistently decreasing, an indication that charter ights
are being replaced by scheduled ights.
Table 3 shows yearly statistics by UK departing airport on the same variables
illustrated in Table 2. The three largest airports for number of ights and routes are
London-Heathrow, London Gatwick and London Stansted. Interestingly, London-
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Heathrow and London-Luton have the lowest ratios of entries and London Luton
and Manchester the lowest ratios of exits proportionally to their size (measured in
number of routes or number of ights at the beginning of the sample). This might
indicate that large established airports are less attractive for new entrants and also
that they are more stable (i.e., they may exhibit a lower exit rate). Furthermore,
the number of routes from the main airports has increased substantially only for the
case of London-Stansted, while secondary airports managed to expand signicantly
the routes covered, as the cases of East Midlands, Aberdeen, Bristol and Cardi¤,
Glasgow-Prestwick, Belfast-City and Southampton indicate. This is one of the most
visible e¤ects of the liberalisation, resulting in a greater variety of products available
to British and European travellers.12 Quite relatedly, the ratio of number of char-
ter/scheduled ights passengers has constantly declined in both main and secondary
airports, remaining stable only for the Teesside and Norwich airports. Generally,
this is indicative of a replacement e¤ect that may have important implications on
the Civil Aviation market structure and that of other vertically related sectors, such
as the tourist industry where charter ights are sold as part of package holidays
o¤ered by tour operators.13
Table 4 illustrates the number of routes served by each airline from each of the
UK ten main airports. The existence of a large proportion of routes that are operated
by an airline originated from the same airport might indicate the existence of a hub
or at least, the existence of a dominant rm in the airport. Interestingly, London
Heathrow and Manchester seem to be hub airports for British Airways and BMI and
London Gatwick for GB Airways. Note how LCC have been rarely operating from
those "hub" airports (especially from Heathrow) and seem to have concentrated
in other airports with no clear dominant rm. Also, it is clear that in a strategy
similar to creating "hubs", some of the LCC have concentrated their business in one
airport, as it is the case of Ryanair and KLM UK in Stansted and MytravelLite and
FlyBe in Birmingham, while Easy Jet has diversied its airport presence since 1998.
12As predicted in Salop (1979), excessive entries may have taken place. However, the di¤erence
between the socially optimal number of routes and the actual one is small when the xed cost
of opening a route is also small. The latter is being suggested by the easiness with which some
established LCC have created a very large European network in the 1997-2005 period.
13It has been noted that the success of LCC may have started a process of disintermediation,
where travel agents are being replaced by Internet booking, and unbundling, where transport is not
part of the tour operatorspackages (see Motta, 2004). Such tour operators as MyTravel, Thomson
and TUI have reacted by establishing their own LCC, respectively, MyTravellite, ThomsonFly and
HapagLLoyd.
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In our empirical study we will test whether entries are more likely to take place in
less established airports without a dominating rm and whether hub economies are
important determinants of the likelihood of entry for both low cost and traditional
carriers.
4 An empirical model of entry and exit
A rms decision to enter or exit a route is analysed by focussing on the character-
istics of the route itself, dened here as an airport pair (e.g., London Stansted and
Rome Ciampino). In addition to route attributes, the characteristics of markets, de-
ned as citypairs (e.g., London-Rome) are considered, together with an evaluation
of how both route- and market-specic factors di¤er in the case of the main LCC
operating in UK. In this section we provide a detailed description of the explanatory
variables used in our models of entry and exit. Table 5 shows how the variables were
constructed and the expected sign of their e¤ect on the dependent variable.
Number of UK departures serving the arrival - D_ No UK depart. to arrival
Some major destinations tend to be served by many di¤erent, geographically
dispersed, departure airports. In order to di¤erentiate its service, an airline might
choose to begin to service a destination only as long as there are not too many
other departure airports with ights to the same destination. It is expected that the
likelihood of an airline starting ights to a destination decreases with the number
of departure airports o¤ering services to that destination. Arguably, a rm is also
more likely to consider exiting from a destination served by many origins.
Number of UK departures used by the airline to serve the arrival - Log No. UK
depart. used by company to serve arrival
The descriptive analysis has already highlighted the airlinestendency to depart
from a limited number of airport, possibly as a consequence of the sunk and bu-
reaucratic costs involved (Berry, 1992). The introduction of this variable aims at
measuring whether operating ights to a destination from many di¤erent origins in
the same country reduces a rms incentive to seek other origins (entry) or to exit
existing ones.
Another route in the citypair already operated by the airline - Dummy Company
operates at least another route in the citypair
Berry (1992) has shown that potential entrants operating from both cities of
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a citypair have a greater propensity to enter that market. Similarly, we focus on
whether a company that is already operating a route within a citypair (say, Lon-
don Stansted to Rome Ciampino) is more willing to open a new route in the same
market (say, London Luton to Rome Ciampino) or to exit one or more of the routes
it is already operating in that market. To this purpose, a dummy is used to indi-
cate whether an airline is serving at least two routes in a citypair. A priori, entry
could be stimulated by the airlines desire to strengthen its market position in or-
der to discourage entry by other potential companies through capacity expansion
(Dixit, 1980). Furthermore, entry may also be spurred by possible synergies among
the routes in the citypair market, perhaps in terms of network or scope economies,
product di¤erentiation or schedule convenience. So a positive relationship is ex-
pected in the entry model. A clear-cut prediction cannot be made for the case of
exit.14
Existence of an exit in the 12 months prior to entry respectively. - D exit in
route in last 12 mths
Always at the route level, we control whether entry is more likely to occur in a
route where another rm has exited in the 12 months prior to the entry. This would
be consistent with a high degree of contestability characterising some of the routes
under study (Borenstein, 1992).
Existence of an entry in the 12 months prior to exit - D entry in route in last
12 mths.
As the above for the exit model.
Number of airlines in a route - Log No. Company in route.
It has often been the case that airlines, especially LCC, at an early stage of
their operations, have sought entry in routes where no other airlines were present.
However, the availability of such routes may have become scarcer as the liberalisation
process gained momentum, forcing the entrant airlines to target routes where other
carriers were already active. The e¤ect of this variable (which is a proxy for market
concentration) is unclear, although standard economic arguments would suggest a
negative coe¢ cient in the entry model, and a positive one in the exit equation.
Presence of seasonal operators - D_ At least one company operates route on
seasonal basis.
14Cost and product synergies may fail to materialize, inducing a positive sign for the coe¢ cient
of this variable in the exit equation. On the other hand, the presence of high entry barriers and of
cost/product synergies would be reected in a negative sign for this variable in the exit model.
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The most successful LCC in Europe, Ryan Air, and to a great extent its main
equivalent competitor, EasyJet, tend not to open routes on a seasonal basis but
commit themselves to run the service throughout the year: this is suggestive of a
market-stealing strategy played by LCC trying to replace seasonal operators. Hence,
it should also be expected that exits are more likely to take place when a seasonal
operator is active in a route.
Herndahl index of total passengers over routes in the citypair - Herndhal of
total passengers in routes within a citypair.
In order to di¤erentiate its service and thereby avoid intense price competition,
an airline may target some arrival airports located in a market which was not pre-
viously served from a given departure city.15 Relatedly, an airline may choose to
occupy a niche in a citypair market where one of its routes attract a very high vol-
ume of passengers.16 In both cases, the Herndahl index of total passengers over
the routes in a citypair would measure a high degree of concentration of tra¢ c, and
would be positively associated with entry. Similarly, lack of viable product di¤er-
entiation opportunities, indicated by high levels of this variable, may increase the
likelihood of observing an exit.
Presence of charter operators - Share charter pass citypair / total pass in citypair
Traditionally charter operators have been linked with the travel distribution sys-
tem in the context of an integrated tourist package holiday industry. The increasing
reliance on the Internet as the major distribution system for both traditional and
low-cost carriers is therefore likely to have put charter operators at a cost disadvan-
tage, given that they cannot rely any more on the very high load factors they could
achieve in the past, as passengers now prefer to book on-line.17 Thus, we expect that
entry and exit are more likely in markets where the proportion of charter passengers
over the total number of passengers is high.
Relative size of the market - Share of tot.passenger in cityp. / total pass in
country area.
15In this case the route, say, e.g., Stansted to Alghero in North Sardinia, coincides with the
citypair as there are no other alternative routes available during the analysed period.
16An example in this case could be London-Barcelona citypair, where substitute arrivals are
Reus and Girona.
17Traditional carriers responded to the LCC ability in using the Internet as a distribution
channel in two ways. First, they expanded their own web sites where they o¤er promotional fares.
Second, on-line travel agents were created which are owned by a pool of airlines and an international
computer reservation agency, e.g., Amadeus. A notable example of the latter type of strategy is
Opodo.
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On the one hand, relatively larger markets should constitute richer targets for
potential entrants.18 If entry is successful, it is also likely that old incumbents may
be forced to exit. On the other hand, large markets have been dominated for long by
established carriers, possibly former national ag-carriers, which may remain pro-
tected by such barriers to entry as the "grandfather" rights which post-liberalisation
allocated slots in the main European, most congested airports to airlines on the basis
of previous use. In this case, entry would be very di¢ cult and exit unlikely.
Incumbentsservice quality - Avg max lagged delay in 12 months over a citypair.
Punctuality is used as a proxi for service quality (Mazzeo, 2003). It often con-
stitutes a critical element in driving businesspeoples willingness to use an airline.
Low levels of quality, proxied by the presence in the market of long delays, may
thus induce entry as the entrant perceives the presence of weak incumbents. This
variable should then be positively associated with entry and exit activities.19
LCC prole - D_LCC
Finally, to capture some of the peculiarities characterising the strategies of the
main LCC, a low-costdummy variable was included for the six main LCC indi-
cated in Table 1. It is expected that these are characterised by a higher entry and a
lower exit rate. Also, this variable is included interacting with the other explanatory
variables in order to capture the di¤erential e¤ect of the above factors on the main
LCC.
Tables 6 presents some descriptive statistics for the variables introduced above,
broken down by the dummies for entry and exit, respectively. LCC are responsible
for about 48% of the entries and 21% of the exits. While conrming the ndings
in Table 1, this evidence also points out how the major LCC primarily targeted the
main countries to secure a stable foothold in the British market. A greater share
of charter passenger in the citypair seems to be positively correlated with entry
activity, but more weakly so for the case of exits, while market size, proxied by the
share of total passengers in the citypair over the total passengers in the country area,
seems to be greater in routes with no entries or exits. Also, about 27% of entries
occurred in routes where an exit had taken place in the previous twelve months,
while only about 13% of routes with no entry exhibited an exit in the same period.
Such a drastic di¤erence does not feature in the case of exits where an entry took
18Consider, for instance, Milan. This variable captures the fact that Milan attracts a very high
share of passengers ying from, say, London, to the North of Italy.
19The twelve months period was chosen to smooth possible high values in a single month.
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place in the previous twelve months. As far as other notable features are concerned,
routes with entry tend to exhibit a larger average delay in their citypair and to have
a smaller number of rms. The latter comment applies also to routes with exits,
which also show a greater share of seasonal carriers.
5 Methodology
Airlines are assumed to rank the routes to enter and exit in order of protability.
More formally, the prots obtainable by airline i from route j at time t can be
represented as
ijt = V1(Aijt; Rjt)1 + V2(FG)2 + ejGt (1)
where Aijt is a vector of time-varying attributes of airline i operating in route j, Rjt
is a vector of time-varying characteristics of route j and its related citypair, FG is a
vector of characteristics of the geographical areas G dened by route js endpoints,
V1 and V2 are vector values functions, 1 and 2 are correspondingly dimensioned
parameter vectors, and ejGt is a disturbance term. For an airline i choosing to enter
(exit) route j at time t over all the possible route choices c in the geographical area
G, the (opposite to the) following condition must hold:
V1(Aijt; Rjt)1+V2(FG)2+ejGt  0  V1(Aict; Rct)1+V2(FG)2+ecGt for all c 2 Gt
(2)
or
[V1(Aijt; Rjt)  V1(Aict; Rct)]1  ecGt   ejGt for all c 2 Gt (3)
If the ejGt are distributed according the type I extreme value cdf, then the random
utility model in (3) is known as the conditional or xed e¤ect logit model (Haab
and McConnell, 2002; Wooldridge, 2002).20
Area-specic attributes that do not vary by alternatives within the choice set can-
not be included in the estimation, unless they are interacted with airline attributes,
since they cancell out in (2). These xed e¤ects depend on the way the geographic
areas (Gt) are determined. To this purpose, we divide both the departure countries
(i.e., England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) and the arrival countries (in-
20This is the same approach used by Hannan (1983) to study entry in the U.S. banking industry
and by Buenstorf and Klepper (2004) for an analysis of entry in the U.S. Tire industry.
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cluding the UK ones for the case of domestic ights) in sub-areas (mostly North,
Centre and South) and group all the observations from routes in each combination
of geographic subareas. Thus, for instance, routes (and citypairs) from the North
and the South of England to the South and the North of France would fall into
four di¤erent groups. Therefore, each group includes routes that in each point in
time: 1) may be operated by di¤erent airlines; 2) are homogeneous in terms of pop-
ulation at endpoints, distance and other area-specic characteristics, which do not
have to be specied among the regressors, unlike the cross-sectional Probit studies,
where route xed-e¤ects are often included (Berry, 1992; Boguslaski et al. 2004; de
Oliveira, 2004; Morrison and Winston, 1990).21
Furthermore, the time e¤ects are considered by tracking the routes connecting
two sub-areas for a time span of six months, namely the rst and the second half
of each year. Observations from geographic areas where no entry (no exit) occured
in the six monthsperiod are automatically dropped during the estimation process.
More than one instance of entry or exit may take place for the same period in a
given geographic area. To enable a more precise study of the di¤erences in the entry
and exit patters of the main LCC and TC, the estimation strategy considers only
the entries and exits by the "Main Airlines", but not those of the "Other airlines"
in Table 1 that are smaller and tend to operate in geographically limited markets.22
6 Results
Tables 7 reports the estimation results for the entry and exit models, obtained from
our two di¤erent samples,All Countriesand Main Countries. Pseudo R2 values
range from 0.1319 to 0.1193 in the entry models and are 0.0416 in the exit model.
Tables 8 and 9 report the odds ratios for the non-interacted and interacted variables
in our model.23
21This is related to the di¤erence in the focus between the two approaches. Our focus is on
the di¤erences in the combination of route/airline characteristics that make an entry or exit arise
in one route and not in another route in a given geographic area. The focus of the traditional
cross-sectional probits of entry is on estimating the probability of entering a route independently
of the choices with respect to the other routes. Our drawback is the arbitrary construction of the
groups. In our opinion, the geographic divisions are appropriate since they include routes which
are close substitutes among them from the point of view of the airline.
22However, their presence in a route is included in our estimation for comparison purposes.
23Please refer to the appendix for details on how odds ratios were calculated for the interacted
variables
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It is important to note that the main LCC were more active in entering relative
to the other main, established carriers, but not in exiting. To further investigate
the di¤erent behaviour of the LCC, the dummy D_LCCwas interacted with the
majority of the regressors.24 Interestingly, the interpretation of the odds ratio of the
low cost dummy (computed at the mean of the interacted variables) as a risk ratio
yields an interesting result: On average, an entry is four to ve times more likely to
have been undertaken by a LCC than by an established carrier.
The probability of entry in a given route appears to be signicantly increased in
the "All Countries" sample when the number of departure airports serving an arrival
is between one and four, and falls losing signicance when the number is between
ve and ten. If we interprete our odds ratios as risk ratios, this would mean that for
the all countries sample (main countries sample) entry is 56% (39%) more likely to
be observed when the number of departure airports serving an arrival is between one
and four than when it is higher than 10. The number of departure airports serving an
arrival does not seem to impact the likelihood of an exit. Quite relatedly, the number
of departure airports used by an airline to serve a destination is signicantly and
negatively associated with entry for LCC and exit for TC. Furthermore, as far as the
strategic implications of the network structure are concerned, the ndings suggest
how entry and exit occur more often in markets where the airlines already operates at
least another route. This e¤ect is in fact stronger for non-low cost than for low cost
airlines, yielding higher odds ratios for the former than for the latter (2.92 vs. 2.37
in the all countries sample and 2.81 vs. 2.25 for the main countries sample). All this
suggests an attempt by airlines, especially non-low cost, to rationalize their networks
by entering routes in markets where they have a foothold so as to strengthen their
competitive position, and exiting others while still retaining a presence in the market.
The fact that this variables coe¢ cients are positive in the exit model indicates low
barriers to entry at the market (citypair) level. Again, the odds ratios for this
variable are much larger for non-low cost than for low cost airlines. Again, if we
interprete the odds ratios as risk ratios, this would mean that a non-low cost (a low
cost) airline is more than three (two) times more likely to exit a route when it is
already present in another route in the citypair than when it is not.
24Initially, all the regressors were interacted. However, in a few cases, the interaction term turned
out to be very small and highly insignicant. In these cases, to save on space and reduce possible
collinearity, the interaction term was dropped: the results, which are available on request, were not
a¤ected.
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A similar indication of contestability is supported by the fact that in the two
samples, entry in a route is highly and signicantly correlated with exits in the same
route in the twelve monthsprior to entry, although less strongly so for the main
LCC (in fact the values of the odds ratios for non low cost doubles those of the non
low cost). Low barriers to entry and exit are a condition for market contestability,
and such ndings suggest a similar interpretation. They also shed some light on a
typical LCCs strategy: that of entering routes previously closed to tra¢ c, and for
which no previous exit was recorded. The presence of other airlines in the route
does not seem to deter entry and could explain LCCs exit from routes not in the
main countries.
However, strong evidence indicates how markets enjoying a large share of pas-
sengers in a country area exhibit a low entry and exit activity.25 This is consistent
with the presence of entry barriers in important markets, such as those connecting
the U.K. with the countriescapitals or business areas (e.g., Milan, Barcelona etc),
where traditional carriers still occupy a dominant position. The Main Airlines
exhibited a greater propensity to exit from citypairs where tra¢ c is concentrated
in one or two routes, suggesting a positive relationship between lack of product
di¤erentiation opportunities and the probability to abandon a route.
Both the hypotheses that routes with seasonal and charter operators are targets
for entry nd some support in the data. More precisely, relative to the traditional
airlines, LCC have often chosen to enter routes with at least one seasonal operator,
but not so much in markets characterized by the presence of charter ights, which
has been, however, an important driver for entry by TC. Exit appears to be highly
uncorrelated with the presence of charter ights, and only weakly associated to
seasonal routes. Long delays at the citypair level appear to attract new entrants but
are not associated with exits.
In the bottom part of Table 7 we provide details on the explanatory power of
our models. The predicted outcome (route expected to be entered or exited) is the
one with the highest predicted probability in each choice set (Greene, 2002). As
a matter of fact, our prediction coincides with the actual entered (exited) route
in the 21.6 (21.7)% of the cases for the "All Countries" sample and in the 19.4
(21.4)% of the cases for the "Main countries". This implies a signicant increase in
the prediction accuracy with respect to the naive prediction, obtained as the mean
25Results do not change if the share is worked out considering the total number of passengers to
the entire destination country.
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number of entries per group over the mean group size, which would be correct only
in the 2.9% and 2.8% of the entry cases, and in the 2.8% and 2.7% of the exit ones.
To further test the predictive power of the model, in Figure 1 we show the density
distribution of the predicted probabilities in the cases of actual entries and actual
"not entries". The same applies for the case of exits in Figure 2. It can be seen
from Figure 1 that this distribution tends to be accumulated around values closer to
zero for actual "not entry" than for actual entries thereby indicating how our model
assigns higher estimated probabilities of entry to actually entered routes than to
those not entered. Similar comments can be made on Figure 2 for the case of exit.26
7 Conclusion
To our knowledge, this is the rst paper to study the post-liberalisation entry and
exit activity by the main traditional and low cost carriers operating from the 10 main
main British airports. Using a conditional logit model, the study identied a number
of airline, route and citypair characteristics that make a route the most likely to be
entered or exited in a given geographic area. These included some explanatory
variables that have not been studied so far, such as the presence of seasonal or
charter operators in the pre-entry (pre-exit) period and the level of quality provided
by the incumbents. These factors proved to be signicant and positively correlated
with entry and/or exit. Another contribution regards the di¤erential impacts of
the models variables in driving the entry and exit behaviour of the main low cost
carriers.
From a policy viewpoint, the results from this study can be used to draw some
conclusions regarding how the British airlines market has changed after the liber-
alisation measures were fully implemented. This is particularly important because
such a market was the rst to experience the low cost revolution, that is, where
Ryan Air and Easyjet, the two most successful low cost carriers in Europe, among
others initially created their hubs. Only in more recent years such companies have
expanded by creating a truly pan-European network with hubs outside the UK. The
descriptive analysis revealed how the low cost carriers, relative to the traditional
carriers, were responsible for a greater share of entries and a lower share of exits:
26The low predicted probabilities of entry and exit reported in the horizontal axis are the result
of the numerosity of observations in a choice set, given that the sum of the predictive probabilities
for each observation in a group has to equal one.
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this was particularly true for the 8 main countries that account for about 85% of all
the ights from the 10 main airports to the 18 main European countries. However,
a considerable increase in routes from the regional airports was also observed, sup-
porting the widespread notion that the liberalisation process has helped revitalise
minor airports. This also indicates more variety available to the passengers, and an
attitude by airlines to exploit product di¤erentiation as a way to prevent head-on
competition.
The econometric analysis has highlighted other policy implications. First, the
limited entry and exit activity in important, large markets, which suggests the pres-
ence of barriers to e¤ective competition. This is in line with the observation by
Bachis and Piga (2006) of higher price increases in larger markets in the period
2002-2005 and raises concerns as to their degree of contestability and the presence
of barriers to entry which the liberalisation process has not eroded.Second, the tradi-
tional carriers strategy to rationalise their network structure by maintaining routes
whose arrival is served from many di¤erent departures and abandoning routes in
markets where they already o¤er a substitute route. Relatedly, traditional carriers
also seem likely to enter a market following an exit by another company. Unfor-
tunately we do not have information regarding whether the entrant is part of the
same strategic alliance of the exiter, an hypothesis that deserves further research in
the future. Finally, the presence of at least an incumbent does not seem to lead to
a reduced entry activity: while this potentially seems a positive outcome, establish-
ing whether reductions in European markets concentration are responsible for lower
prices as in Evans and Kessides (1994) for the U.S. routes, is also a matter for future
research.
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8 Appendix
It is widely known that in a logit model, the odds ratios of a non-interacted variable
k are the exponential of the estimated coe¢ cient k. As shown by Norton (2004),
this is not true for the case of interacted variables. In fact, the odds ratios for
interacted variables are usually miscalculated by standard econometric packages. In
this appendix we show how we calculated the odds ratios according to our model
In our model, the dummy variable D_LCC which identies LCC, is interacted
with m of the other n explanatory variables m < n (total number of explanatory
variables = n+1). The estimated probabilities of entry (P1) and not entry (P0) for
observation i can be written as27:
P1 =
Exp[0D_LCC +
Pm
k=1 kXkD_LCC +
Pn
k=1 kXk]
1 + Exp [0D_LCC +
Pm
k=1 kXkD_LCC] +
Pn
k=1 kXk]
P0 =
1
1 + Exp[0D_LCC +
Pm
k=1 kXkD_LCC +
Pn
k=1 kXk]
where  and  correspond to estimated coe¢ cientes of the non-interacted and inter-
acted terms respectively. The odds of observation i can hence be written as:
P1
P0
= Exp
"
0D_LCC +
mX
k=1
kXkD_LCC +
nX
k=1
kXk
#
Recall that the odds ratio (OR) for a variable Xk is the ratio of odds of two
observations that di¤er only in the value of the explanatory variable Xk. For the
sake of simplicity, let us consider that Xk is a dummy variable, which takes values
1 and 0.28 Obtaining its odds ratio would imply calculating the following:
ORk =
P1
P0
jXk=1
P1
P0
jXk=0
As commented before, if the P1s are close to zero, (as in our case, where the
average probability of observing an entry (or an exit) in a given route is less than 3%),
then the odds ratio is a good approximation to the much more easily interpretable
27For notational simplicity, in this section we drop out the subscripts corresponding to the
observation. We also refer only to the event of entry. We also apply this analysis to the exit
estimations.
28The resulting expressions for the odds ratios in the case of non-dummy variables would be the
same if a unit increase in the variable was considered.
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risk ratio, RRk:
RRk =
P1 jXk=1
P1 jXk=0
If Xk is one of the variables which is interacted with the LCC dummy, (k(m;n]),
its odds ratio can be writt en as:
ORk =
Exp[0D_LCC + kD_LCC +
Pm
k=2 kXkD_LCC + k +
Pn
k=2 kXk]
Exp[0D_LCC +
Pm
k=2 kXkD_LCC +
Pn
k=2 kXk]
which yields:
ORk = Exp[k + kD_LCC]
It is thus implicit that the odds ratios of a variable k will di¤er for low cost
and for non low-cost airlines. Table 9 report respectively the odds ratios of the
interacted variables for non LCC (D_LCC = 0 and hence, ORk = Exp[k]) and
for LCC (D_LCC = 1 and hence, ORk = Exp[k + k]).
It is straightforward to show that if Xk is a non-interacted variable, its odds
ratio will be:
ORk = Exp[k]
Table 8 reports the odds ratios for non-interacted variables.
Finally, the odds ratio of the dummy variable D_LCC can be written as:
ORk =
Exp[0 +
Pm
k=1 kXk +
Pn
k=1 kXk]
Exp[
Pn
k=1 kXk]
which yields:
ORD_LCC = Exp
"
0 +
mX
k=1
kXk
#
The interpretation of the odds ratio for the dummy variableD_LCC is somehow
trickier, as it also comprises the m interacted variables. We evaluate this odds ratio
at the mean of these variables and interpret it as an "average" e¤ect. The odds
ratios for D_LCC are also reported in Table 9.
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Figure 1: Predicted probabilities of entry (All Countries Sample)
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Figure 2: Predicted probabilities of exit (All Countries Sample)
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Table 1: Number of entries, exits, routes, flights and mean number of companies in operated routes by airline. 
Entries Exits Routes Flights 
 
Mean number of 
companies s 
Airlines 97-99 00-01 02-04 97-99 00-01 02-04 99 01 03 99 01 03 99 01 03 
Ryanair 16 16 27 0 2 10 25 41 78 20183 32342 53486 1.26 1.15 1.13 
Easyjet 11 6 36 0 1 6 17 23 72 12793 20684 59330 1.19 1.31 1.44 
Gofly 16 13 2 0 4 8 18 31  9334 16627  1.32 1.32  
MyTravelLite 0 0 12 0 0 3   13   4017   1.32 
Flybe 8 9 11 0 6 12 26 34 32 17195 26491 24462 1.47 1.53 1.52 
KLM UK 8 14 8 7 5 7 27 27 25 27577 23169 2517 1.29 1.34 1.12 
Subtotal low cost 59 58 96 7 18 46 113 156 220 87082 119313 143812 1.31 1.33 1.31 
Aer Lingus 1 1 0 3 2 3 12 12 9 17367 17107 14179 1.54 1.81 1.78 
Air Europa 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 2 298 573 845 3.21 2.50 3.50 
Air France 3 1 1 4 2 2 5 6 3 8649 8132 6660 1.84 2.19 2.52 
Alitalia 6 0 0 7 2 2 10 6 5 7585 6488 4988 1.59 2.28 2.28 
BMI 9 7 15 4 9 17 40 40 42 41367 43262 43412 1.89 1.94 1.75 
British Airways 29 18 46 22 25 75 163 165 157 150122 154738 148662 1.55 1.53 1.63 
Finnair 1 0 0 3 1 0 4 3 2 2169 2436 1879 1.34 1.34 1.50 
Iberia 3 0 0 6 1 1 14 9 9 5823 6078 5829 1.50 1.77 1.63 
KLM 1 0 5 0 0 2 5 5 11 6508 6679 15771 1.77 1.55 1.71 
Lufthansa 5 2 0 6 7 3 20 21 17 16699 19174 18749 1.78 1.76 1.96 
Maersk Air 6 2 4 0 6 17 17 16 19 11052 10168 8769 1.09 1.16 1.24 
SAS 2 2 0 4 3 0 13 11 8 10604 10924 9162 1.59 1.74 1.76 
Swiss 6 2 0 1 1 4 12 12 11 6985 7471 10839 1.20 1.08 1.32 
Olympic Airways 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 4 3 966 1385 1283 4.00 2.11 1.53 
Virgin 3 1 0 0 6 0 5 4  1458 693  2.40 2.92  
Air Portugal 0 1 2 0 0 1 4 5 7 2150 2559 2980 1.50 1.60 1.41 
CSA       3 4 5 1258 1597 2381 1.78 1.52 1.47 
Eurowings 4 3 5 3 3 2 2 5 6 1175 1634 2340 1.00 1.13 1.69 
Monarch 0 2 7 1 0 0 5 6 14 884 1594 3677 1.13 1.50 1.77 
GB Airways ltd 9 5 7 1 2 2 13 15 21 3971 4485 6604 1.29 1.76 1.53 
Austrian Air 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 1313 1360 1737 2.00 2.00 2.00 
Lauda-Air 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 1  771 561  1.50 1.00  
Other airlines 81 64 105 72 56 90 132 147 131 74503 73020 58699 1.47 1.36 1.38 
Total 229 171 294 146 146 268 598 656 704 460759 501431 513257 1.51 1.50 1.51 
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Table 2: Number of entries, exits, route, flights, operating airline sand ratio of charter passengers over schedule passengers by country 
Entries Exits Routes Flights Airlines 
 
Charter/Schedule 
passengers 
Contries 97/99 00/01 02/04 97/99 00/01 02/04 99 01 03 99 01 03 99 01 03 99 01 03 
France 27 23 36 19 13 30 73 82 97 43376 47491 50831 19 17 16 0.050 0.045 0.042 
Germany 36 17 33 21 28 31 74 70 75 53771 59119 60235 17 14 17 0.005 0.004 0.002 
Irish Republic 14 11 20 11 11 15 52 50 56 40674 42585 39104 12 11 11 0.002 0.001 0.002 
Italy 33 13 25 20 13 14 75 71 91 28565 32454 34844 10 8 10 0.163 0.128 0.100 
Netherlands 9 6 12 6 6 14 37 38 31 36445 38762 33738 12 11 12 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Spain 30 39 64 21 11 38 229 242 258 20461 30439 41701 11 11 15 3.993 2.349 1.362 
Switzerland 16 4 4 9 4 10 31 26 32 22654 21353 22538 7 8 5 0.060 0.066 0.068 
United Kingdom 6 22 60 2 24 80 128 367 377 140784 154372 160553 16 17 17 - 0.008 0.004 
Main Countries 171 135 254 109 110 232 699 946 1017 386730 426575 443544 104 97 103 0.462 0.406 0.310 
Austria 3 2 7 1 5 2 19 16 19 4585 5010 5326 5 6 5 0.267 0.269 0.281 
Belgium 7 10 3 5 8 12 19 20 20 22964 19880 15624 7 10 8 0.001 0.001 0.002 
Croatia 8 2 2 1 0 3 10 10 11 880 924 888 2 2 2 0.081 0.070 0.150 
Czech Republic 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 4 6 2547 3429 4670 4 3 3 - - - 
Denmark 7 2 3 8 2 2 15 18 15 11409 13026 12734 8 8 8 0.020 0.006 0.003 
Finland 0 2 2 4 2 2 7 8 10 3023 3844 2960 2 4 4 0.042 0.060 0.132 
Greece 3 2 4 2 3 2 29 31 36 3631 4013 3802 5 5 5 1.274 1.422 1.336 
Norway 10 3 3 9 7 2 23 15 12 9016 7014 6157 8 5 5 0.032 0.006 0.001 
Portugal 10 7 9 2 4 6 35 36 37 6488 7075 8005 6 6 8 1.354 1.173 0.907 
Sweden 10 6 4 5 5 5 15 16 12 9486 10641 9547 6 5 5 0.047 0.017 0.000 
Total 229 171 294 146 146 268 874 1120 1195 460759 501431 513257 157 151 156 0.241 0.195 0.144 
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Table 3: Number of entries, exits, routes, ratio of charter passengers vs schedule passengers and number of flights in UK airports. 
Entries Exits Flights 
 
Charter/Schedule  
passengers Routes 
Airports 97/99 00/01 02/04 97/99 00/01 02/04 1999 2001 2003 99 01 03 99 01 03 
Birmingham(BHX) 15 17 32 6 11 40 39879 46107 47129 0.743 0.576 0.365 65 73 73 
Edinburgh(EDI) 9 10 30 1 5 27 29394 36655 40104 0.257 0.145 0.071 45 50 57 
London-Gatwick(LGW) 46 29 56 42 30 49 65113 65150 67413 0.870 0.711 0.504 110 107 98 
Glasgow(GLA) 10 15 33 8 8 36 28176 32503 29797 2.438 0.718 0.562 63 63 68 
London -Heathrow (LHR) 22 10 7 28 19 17 144350 144174 140543 0.002 0.002 0.002 74 69 71 
London-Luton(LTN) 16 3 9 18 3 2 17551 19782 21388 0.377 0.239 0.135 50 56 54 
Manchester(MAN) 19 15 40 9 9 39 50622 55205 59461 1.716 1.187 0.910 87 84 96 
Newcastle(NCL) 6 16 22 7 19 16 14565 15931 13595 1.869 1.040 0.781 37 39 40 
London Stansted(STN) 57 44 51 17 33 26 51691 60459 70902 0.162 0.079 0.050 83 109 129 
London City(LCY) 29 12 14 10 9 16 19418 25465 22925 0.001 0.001 0.000 26 36 31 
Main Airports 229 171 294 146 146 268 460759 501431 513257 0.373 0.285 0.207 640 686 717 
Aberdeen           0.242 0.117 0.108 11 35 37 
Belfast International          4.024 0.653 0.391 21 32 34 
Bournemouth           1.686 1.515 0.547 9 16 20 
Bristol           1.659 0.785 0.536 23 46 45 
Cardiff           3.349 1.949 1.049 18 30 39 
East Midlands           2.439 2.313 0.577 21 25 40 
Leeds-Bradford          0.944 1.246 0.605 16 23 25 
Liverpool           0.265 0.122 0.167 16 19 25 
Glasgow-Prestwick          0.130 0.214 0.093 5 11 22 
Teesside          1.453 2.342 1.505 14 16 15 
Norwich           0.953 1.229 1.106 9 12 10 
Blackpool           1.875 5.301 0.544 4 6 8 
City Of Derry          -- 0.000 0.013  1 2 
Belfast-City Airport           0.000 0.001 0.000 3 21 19 
Humberside          1.456 1.486 1.972 10 14 12 
Sheffield City           0.002 0.005 -- 2 3  
Southampton           0.131 0.197 0.161 7 10 20 
Others          0.862 0.217 0.193 45 114 105 
Total          0.433 0.327 0.237 874 1120 1195 
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Table 4: Number of routes operated from/to main airports by airline. 
1998 2003 
Airlines BHX EDI LGW GLA LHR LTN MAN  NCL STA LCY BHX EDI LGW GLA LHR LTN MAN NCL STA LCY 
Ryanair 1  1   1 1  13  3 1 1   2 1 1 69  
EasyJet  1  0  12      7 16 6  15  9 19  
GoFly  0       8            
MyTravelLite           13          
FlyBE 8  3 4 2 2   2  13 3 3 3 2 1  4  3 
KLM UK 1 4  3 1  2 2 13 3    1   1  22 1 
Low Cost 10 5 4 7 3 15 3 2 36 3 29 11 20 10 2 18 2 14 110 4 
Aer Lingus 3 1  1 3  2 1 1  1 1 1 1 3  1   1 
Air Europa   2          2        
Air France  1   2  1   2     1  1 1   
Alitalia   5  3    1 2   2  3      
BMI 3 8  6 17  6     9  6 17  10    
British Airways 11 18 36 21 41 3 28 4 2  15 16 34 19 32 1 32 4  4 
Finnair   3  3  1  1      1  1    
Iberia   3  9  2      1  7  1    
KLM     3    2  1 1  1 3  1 1 2 1 
Lufthansa 3    10  5  1 1 3 1   6  6   1 
Maersk Air 8  3     1   17  2        
SAS  1   7  3  2  1    5  2    
Swiss 2 1   2  2   4 2    4  2   3 
Olympic Airways     1        1  1  1    
Virgin   1  1    1            
Air Portugal     4        3  4      
CSA     1  1  1  1 1   1  1  1  
Eurowings   1      3  2 1      1 1 1 
Monarch      5       3   5 6    
GB Airways Ltd   9  2        20  1      
Austrian Air     1        1  1      
Lauda-Air   2    1              
Other Airlines 4 6 39 12 10 10 15 13 7 10 4 16 31 12 6 3 20 7 15 17 
Total 44 41 108 47 123 33 70 21 58 22 76 57 121 49 98 27 87 28 129 32 
 (BHX: Birmingham, EDI: Edinburgh, LGW: London Gatwick, LHR: London Heathrow, LTN: London Luton, MAN: Manchester Intl., NCL: Newcastle, STA: London Stansted, LCY: London City). 
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Table 5- The variables and their expected signs. 
Variables Description Entry Exit 
D_LCC Dummy = 1 for LCC + + 
D_ No UK depart. to arrival D_ No UK depart. to arrival: 1-4 = 1, if 
number of departures used to serve arrival 
is between 1 and 4 (incl.);  
D_ No UK depart. to arrival: 5-10 = 1 if 
number of departures used to serve arrival 
is between 5 and 10 (incl.)  
Reference category >10 
- + 
Log No. UK depart. used by 
company to serve arrival 
Natural log of the number of UK departures 
used by the airline to serve the arrival 
- + 
Dummy Company operates at 
least another route in the citypair 
Dummy = 1 if the airline operates another 
route in the citypair 
+ - 
D – exit in route in last 12 mths Dummy = 1 if there was and exit in the 12 
months prior to the event of entry 
+  
D – entry in route in last 12 mths Dummy = 1 if there was and entry in the 
12 months prior to the event of exit 
 + 
Log No. Company in route Natural log of the number of incumbents in 
the route 
+ - 
D_ At least one company operates 
route on seasonal basis 
Dummy = 1 if there is at least one 
company operating the route seasonally,  
+/- + 
Herfindhal of total passengers in 
routes within a citypair 
Herfindahl index of the total passengers in 
the routes in the citypair 
+ - 
Share charter pass citypair / total 
pass in cityp. 
Number of charter passengers in the 
citypair over the total number of 
passengers in the citypair 
+ + 
share of tot.passenger in cityp. / 
total pass in country area 
Number of charter passengers in the 
citypair over the total number of 
passengers in the country area (geographic 
divisions of the origin and destination 
countries). 
+/- +/- 
Avg max lagged delay in 12 
months over a citypair 
Average of the 12 month maximum lagged 
in the city-pair 
+ +/- 
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Table 6 - Descriptive Statistics of the variables from the estimation samples of the ENTRY and EXIT. 
ENTRY MODEL EXIT MODEL 
All countries Main countries All Countries Main Countries Variables 
D_ENTRY 
=0 
D_ENTRY 
=1 
D_ENTRY 
=0 
D_ENTRY 
=1 
D_EXIT 
 =0 
D_EXIT 
 =1 
D_EXIT 
 =0 
D_EXIT 
 =1 
D_LCC     Mean .257 .48 .278 .488 .261 .207 .28 .211 
D_ No UK depart. to arrival: 1-4    Mean .38 .385 .362 .354 .381 .371 .364 .330 
D_ No UK depart. to arrival: 5-10        
Mean (Std) 
Mean .348 .351 .357 .38 .357 .377 .364 .405 
Log No. UK depart. used by 
company to serve arrival 
Mean (Std) .472 (.61) .476 (.60) .488 (.624) .486 (.62) .49 (.62) .515 (.594) .495 (.639) .534 (.618) 
 Min - Max 0 – 2.197 0 – 2.197 0 – 2.197 0 – 2.197 0 – 2.2 0 – 2.08 0 – 2.2 0 – 2.08 
Dummy Company operates at least 
another route in the citypair 
Mean .38 .383 .398 .397 .375 .43 .385 .455 
D – exit in route in last 12 mths Mean .128 .272 .131 .273     
D – entry in route in last 12 mths Mean     .294 .316 .298 .337 
Log No. Company in route Mean (Std) .360 (.433) .310 (.405) .349 (.427) .300 (.401) .374 (.434) .333 (.398) .356 (.426) .326 (.392) 
 Min - Max 0 – 1.386 0 – 1.386 0 – 1.386 0 – 1.386 0 – 1.386 0 – 1.386 0 – 1.386 0 – 1.386 
D_ At least one company operates 
route on seasonal basis 
Mean .086 .09 .081 .088 .083 .137 .084 .147 
Herfindhal of total passengers in 
routes within a citypair 
Mean (Std) .503 (.246) .59 (.286) .487 (.25) .571 (.29) .506 (.254) .61  (.292) .487 (.257) .584 (.298) 
 Min - Max .111 – 1 .123 – 1 .111 – 1 .123 – 1 .117 – 1 .117 – 1 .117 – 1 .117 – 1 
Share charter passengers citypair / 
total passengers in citypair. 
Mean (Std) .09 (.202) .126 (.244) .09 (.203) .122 (.24) .075 (.184) .069 (.192) .076 (.187) .073 (.203) 
 Min - Max 0 – 1 0 – .993 0 – 1 0 – .993 0 – 1 0 – 1 0 – 1 0 – 1 
share of total passengers in citypair / 
total passengers in country area 
Mean (Std) .291 (.248) .235 (.254) .272 (.239) .22 (.24) .275 (.246) .209 (.248) .246 (.226) .183 (.221) 
 Min - Max 4.2E-5 – 1 4.2E-5 – 1 1.7E-5 – 1 4.2E-5 – .99 1.6E-5 – 1 1.2E-5 – 1 1.6E-5 – 1 0 – 1 
Average max lagged delay in 12 
months over a citypair 
Mean (Std) 17.1 (8.97) 21.05 (14.2) 17.2 (9.03) 21.2 (14.6) 16.8 (8.5) 15.4 (7.8) 16.9 (8.5) 15.6 (7.9) 
 Min - Max -11.0 – 179 -12.1 – 154 -11.0 – 179 -12.1 – 154 -7.77 – 130 -5.0 – 52 -7.77 – 130 -5.0 – 52 
 N 14909 444 13896 373 11867 342 10131 279 
Source: UK Civil Aviation Authority. D_ stands for Dummy.  
Table 7 - Conditional Logit estimations for Entry on European routes from UK. 
 ENTRY EXIT 
Regressors All countries Main countries All countries Main countries
D_LCC 1.86 (3.79)*** 1.67 (3.25)*** -.069 (.12) .075 (.12) 
D_ No UK depart. to arrival: 1-4 .444 (1.93)* .330 (1.34) -.167 (.70) -.145 (.58) 
D_ No UK depart. to arrival: 5-10 .017 (.08) .048 (.22) -.062 (.30) -.024 (.11) 
Log No. UK depart. used by 
company to serve arrival 
-.090 (.55) -.105 (.62) -.492 (3.37)*** -.497 (3.22)***
“”*D_LCC -1.02 (4.1)*** -1.04 (3.97)*** -.474 (1.46) -.499 (1.46) 
Dummy Company operates at 
least another route in the citypair 
1.07 (5.21)*** .1.03 (4.59)*** 1.32 (6.64)*** 1.26 (5.75)***
“”*D_LCC -.208 (.70) -.223 (0.71) -.508 (1.33) -.377 (.92) 
D – exit in route in last 12 mths 1.15 (6.37)*** 1.11 (5.85)***   
“”*D_LCC -.707 (2.58)*** -.816 (2.77)***   
D – entry in route in last 12 mths   .098 (.58) .170 (.93) 
“ ”* D_LCC   -.190 (.59) -.011 (.03) 
Log No. Company in route .897 (4.22)*** .804 (3.44)*** .278 (1.38) .316 (1.40) 
“”*D_LCC .301 (.94) .305 (0.89) .752 (1.77)* .655 (1.43) 
D_ At least one company operates 
route on seasonal basis 
-.429 (1.63) -.500 (1.67)* .411 (1.91)* .354 (1.48) 
“”*D_LCC .761 (1.71)* .838 (1.77) * .419 (.67) .490 (.76) 
Herfindhal of total passengers in 
routes within a citypair 
.212 (.47) .074 (.15) 1.08 (2.66)*** 1.24 (2.84)***
“”*D_LCC .622 (1.09) .690 (1.13) -.414 (.59) -.956 (1.21) 
Share charter pass citypair / total 
pass in cityp. 
1.42 (3.43)*** .971 (2.10)** .567 (1.07) .827 (1.38) 
“”*D_LCC -1.04 (1.82)* -.587 (0.96) -.634 (.62) -.607 (.58) 
share of tot.passenger in cityp. / 
total pass in country area 
-1.38 (2.77)*** -1.29 (2.29)** -2.37 (4.6)*** -2.06 (3.4)***
“”*D_LCC .182 (.32) .138 (.22) 1.58 (2.30)** 1.25 (1.5) 
Avg max lagged delay in 12 
months over a citypair 
.049 (8.3)*** .046 (7.50)*** .001 (.06) .001 (.14) 
Pseudo R2 0.1319 0.1193 0.0416 0.0416 
% groups correctly predicted 21.6 19.4 21.7 21.4 
N 15353 13371 12209 10410 
Number of groups 319 258 249 196 
Mean Number of entries per group 1.40 1.45 1.37 1.42 
Mean group size 48.13 51.8 49.0 53.1 
Prob. Of a naïve prediction 2.90 2.79 2.79 2.67 
Source: UK Civil Aviation Authority. z-statistic in parenthesis. *, **, ***: coefficient significant, 
respectively, at 10%, 5% and 1% level. D_ stands for Dummy. “”*D_LCC = interaction of variable in 
previous row with the dummy D_LCC. 
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Table 8: Odds ratios for non-interacted variables. 
 ENTRY MODEL EXIT MODEL 
Regressors All countries Main countries All countries Main countries 
D_ No UK depart. to arrival: 1-4 1.56 1.39 0.846 0.864 
D_ No UK depart. to arrival: 5-10 1.02 1.05  0.939  0.976  
Avg max lagged delay in 12 months 
over a citypair 
1.05 1.05  1.00  1.00  
Source: UK Civil Aviation Authority. Refer to z-statistics in table 7 for details on the significance of 
the explanatory variables.  
 
Table 9: Odds ratios for the interacted variables. 
 ENTRY MODEL EXIT MODEL 
Regressors All countries Main countries All countries Main countries 
D_LCC + 5.22 4.13 0.94 0.79 
Other interacted regressors: If not Low Cost Airlines (D_lowcost=0). 
Log No. UK depart. used by 
company to serve arrival 
0.91 0.90  0.61 0.60  
Dummy Company operates at least 
another route in the citypair 
2.92  2.81 3.76  3.54  
D – exit in route in last 12 mths 3.17  3.04    
D – entry in route in last 12 mths   1.10 1.18  
Log No. Company in route 2.45 2.23  1.32  1.37  
D_ At least one company operates 
route on seasonal basis 
2.14  2.31  1.51  1.42  
Herfindhal of total passengers in 
routes within a citypair 
1.24  1.07  2.96  3.47  
Share charter pass citypair / total 
pass in cityp. 
4.15  2.64  1.76  2.29  
Share of tot.passenger in cityp. / total 
pass in country area 
0.25  0.27  0.09  0.13  
Other interacted regressors: If Low Cost Airlines (D_lowcost=1). 
Log No. UK depart. used by 
company to serve arrival 
0.33 
 
0.32 0.38 0.37 
Dummy Company operates at least 
another route in the citypair 
2.37 
 
2.25 2.26 2.43 
D – exit in route in last 12 mths 1.56 1.34   
D – entry in route in last 12 mths   0.91 1.17 
Log No. Company in route 3.31 3.03 2.80 2.64 
D_ At least one company operates 
route on seasonal basis 
1.39 1.40 2.29 2.33 
Herfindhal of total passengers in 
routes within a citypair 
2.30 2.15 1.96 1.33 
Share charter pass citypair / total 
pass in cityp. 
1.47 1.47 0.93 1.25 
Share of tot.passenger in cityp. / total 
pass in country area 
0.30 0.31 0.46 0.44 
Source: UK Civil Aviation Authority. Refer to z-statistics in table 7 for details on the significance of 
the explanatory variables. + Odds ratio for D_LCC: Interacted explanatory variables at their sample 
means. 
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